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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LABOR ARBITRATION
or
ALICE THROUGH THE LOOKING. GLASS
CLYDE W. SUM-M~RS*
"Oh, what fun it is! How I wish I was one of
them! I wouldn't mind. being a Pawn if only I
might join-though of course I should like to
be a Queen best."'
Undaunted by their adventures in the Wonderland of labor
disputes, the courts have eagerly entered the Looking Glass World
of labor arbitration. Anxious to join in the activities, they have
been unaware of their awkwardness and undismayed by their
blunders. Like Alice, they have not been entirely content to. be
pawns, but have longed to be queens in this world quite reversed
from their own.
The courts may be asked to join at either of two points in the
arbitration process-either before the grievance has been sub-
mitted to the arbitrator or after the arbitrator has issued his
award. Under the New York ARBrRATION LAw,2 if one of the par-
ties refuses to arbitrate, the other may ask the court for an order
compelling arbitration, or he may simply give notice of an intent
to arbitrate and thereby force the resisting party to move to
stay arbitration. The only function of the court is to determine
whether "a written contract providing for arbitration was made
. and there was a failure to comply therewith."' 4  If the
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Buffalo.
1. Carroll, ALICE THRouGH THE LOOJx-G GLAss, (Peter Pauper Press, Mount
Vernon, N. Y.) p. 42.
2. C. P. A., Art 84.
3. C. P. A. §§1450, 1458. Court intervention prior to arbitration may occur in a third
manner. If one of the parties brings an action upon an issue referable to arbitration,
the supreme court can stay all proceedings in the action until arbitration is had. C. P. A.§1451.
4. C. P. A. §1450.
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parties proceed to arbitration but one is dissatisfied with the award
he may move to vacate or modify the award, or he may refuse to
comply and force the other party to move to confirm.' The award
may be vacated "where the arbitrators exceeded 'their powers' 
and may be modified "where there was an evident miscalculation of
figures, or an evident mistake in the description of any person,
thing, or property referred to in the award.' 'T These provisions,
while permitting the courts to participate, make the courts appear
as mere pawns in enforcing the arbitration agreement of the
parties. But pawns can become queens,- and -courts by inter-
vening at either of these two points may achieve the power to rule
over labor arbitration.
Today, arbitration is the accepted method of settling griev-
ances which arise under a collective bargaining agreement. Over80% of all agreements provide for arbitration as the final step in
the grievance procedure. We cannot examine all aspects ofjudicial participation in labor arbitration, but will deal with what
is perhaps the most critical aspect-the intervention by the courts
on the merits of the grievance. This requires first an inquiry into
the extent to which courts enforce their own judgment on the
merits, second, an articulation of some of the misconceptions which
cause the courts to stumble, and third, a suggestion of some of the
factors which should be weighed in determining the proper meas-
ure of judicial supervision.9 Study has been restricted to New
York labor arbitration cases under the ARBITRATIO- LAw. Com-
mercial arbitration is not considered directly, for the extent of
court intervention and the problems raised are markedly different.
5. C. P. A. §§1461, 1462, and 1463.
6. C. P. A. §1462. The award may be vacated also for defects in the arbitrationprocedure as contrasted with failure of the arbitrator to decide the merits correctly.Thus it may be vacated if "procured by dorruption, fraud, or undue means", if there
was "evident partiality or corruption" in the arbitrator, or if the arbitrator failed toprovide an opportunity for a full and fair hearing.
7. C. P. A. §1462-a. The award may be modified also where it is imperfect inform only, or where the arbitrator has made an award on a matter not submitted to himbut not affecting the merits of the decision upon matters submitted.
8. For a careful study of the legal basis for arbitration in New York and the
enforceability of awards, see Freidin, Legal Status of Labor Arbitration, in First An-
nual Conference on Labor Law, New York University, 1948) 233.
9. For closely related studies directed toward the questions of the jurisdiction ofthe arbitrator and the arbitrability of the issues, see Clifton, Arbitration and Arbitra-bility, Third Annual Conference on Labor Law (New York University, 1950) 187;Scoles, Review of Labor Arbitration Awards on Jurisdictional Grounds, 17 U. oF CrI. L.R-v. 616 (1950) ; Syme, Arbitrability of Labor Disputes, 5 RUTGERS L. REV. 455 (1951).For a study of the non-legal aspects of arbitrability, see 1951 Report of the Com-
nittee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Employer Contracts, Section of La-bor Relation Law, American Bar Association, published in 6 ARB. 3. 200 (1951).
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I.
To the Looking Glass World it was
Alice that said, "I've a sceptre in
hand, I've a crown on my head' 01
The courts repeatedly affirm that they are little more than
pawns with no power to examine into the merits of the grievance.
Where the courts are asked to intervene prior to arbitration by a
motion to compel or a motion to stay arbitration, they have said,
"In proceedings of this character two questions must be
determined: (1) Was an agreement to arbitrate made, and
(2) has there been a refusal to arbitrate . . .The merits of
the controversy will be determined not by the court but by
the tribunal designated by the parties in the agreement to
arbitrate."'
Where courts have been asked to intervene after the arbitrator
has issued his award, they have been equally positive in stating
their limited powers.
"The award of an arbitrator cannot be set aside for mere
errors of judgment either as to the law or as to the facts. If
he keeps within his jurisdiction and is not guilty of fraud,
corruption or other misconduct it is unassailable, operates as
a final and conclusive judgment, and however disappointing it
may be the parties must abide by it."12
The first power which the courts assert is to determine whether
there exists between the parties a valid agreement to arbitrate'
This involves questions such as whether the parties made a valid
contract, whether it contains an arbitration clause, and whether it
has been terminated. 4 If the employer sells his business or the
10. Supra n. I, at p. 181.
11. Mcncher v. B. S. Abeles & Kahn, 274 App. Div. 585, 590, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 718, 723
(lst Dep't, 1948).
12. Matter of Motor Haulage and International Brotherhdod of Teamsters, 272
App. Div. 382, 383, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 352; 353 (1st Dep't, 1947).
13. This question is usually raised on an application to compel arbitration or a
motion to stay arbitration, although it might possibly be raised on a motion to con-
firm or vacate if the resisting party has neither participated in the arbitration nor been
served with a notice to arbitrate as provided in C. P. A. § 1458. For cases in which the
court has held there is an existing contract to arbitrate, see In re Atlantic Basin Iron
Works Inc., 59 N. Y. S. 2d 662 (1945); Barbein v. Superior Meter Co., 12 L. A. 614
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1949); In re Heating, Piping & Air Conditioning Contractors, 12 L. A.
243 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1949).
14. Sanders v. Newu York Joint Board, 280 App. Div. 781, 113 N.Y.S. 2d 532 (1st
Dep't, 1952); Video Television Inc. v. District 65, 18 L. A. 197 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1952);
In re U. S. Multigraphing Co., 15 L. A. 298 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). But see in re Duffy,
18 L. A. 68 (N. Y. Sup. Ct 1952), where the court said that the period of time covered
by the agreement was for the arbitrator. The fact that the contract has expired does
not prevent arbitration of grievance occurring prior to the expiration date. Dumont
Electric Corp v. Cliff, 17 L. A. 319 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
union suffers a schism, there may also be presented the question
whether the parties, are the same as those who made the agree-
ment.15 These issues are usually collateral to the merits of the
grievance, for they go to the existence of an agreement, not the
meaning of its terms. However, in some cases the court's deter-
mination of these questions may constitute an adjudication of the
grievance on its merits. Thus if an employer closes his business
and the union charges that this amounts to a lockout, the court in
finding that the employer has dissolved and thereby terminated
the agreement actually rules on the merits of the union's claim."
Similarly, if the employer refuses to pay over check-off funds or
otherwise recognize a local which has seceded from its parent, the
court in determining whether the local is a party to the agreement
will decide the merits of the dispute.
The courts, however, do not limit themselves to determining
whether there is an agreement, but also determines the scope of
the agreement. The Belding Heminway Company was a member
of a New York City employers association which had made a
collective agreement with the union providing for a closed shop.
Two months after the agreement was made, the Company opened
a new plant in New Jersey but refused to operate under a closed
shop, contending that the agreement did not apply to plants outside
New York City. The union contended that the plant had been
established to avoid the obligations of the agreement and sought to
arbitrate the question whether employees in the New Jersey plant
who failed to join the union should be discharged. The Court of
Appeals held that the arbitration should be stayed because "the
scope of the collective bargaininz agreement . . . was for the
court, not for the arbitrators.'"1 The decision rests on the simple
15. Copenhagen Castle Beer Corp. v. Beer Drivers Local Union, 17 L. A. 3 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct., 1951) ; Baziller v. Livingston, 17 L. A. 117 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1951) ; Building
Service Employees Union v. Pinkerton National Detective Agency, 16 L. A. 128 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct., 1950). However where the employer participated in the arbitration and one of
the issues presented was whether the employer's dissolution terminated the contract, the
employer was held to have waived his right to claim the arbitrator had no jurisdiction.
Korman v. Dreyer Bros. Homne Furnishings, 16 L. A. 251 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1951).
16. See, for example, In re Kossoff, 276 App. Div. 621, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 689 (lst Dep't,
1950). The court in such a case need not rule on the merits, for it could reason that
dissolution does not terminate the contract prior to its expiration date. Sanders v. New
York Joint Board, 17 L. A. 762 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1952). The court could then leave
to the arbitrator the question whether under the agreement the dissolution justifies the
employer's layoff of his employees.
17. Matter of Belding Heminway Co. and Wholesale & Warehouse Workers Union,
295 N. Y. 541, 68 N. E. 2d 681 (1946). Accord, In re Dumon Electric Corp., 14 L. A.
1005 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1950) ; but se., In re Gluckstern's Restaurant, - A. D. , 113
N. Y. S. 2d 372 (1st Dep't, 1952).
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logic that if the New Jersey plant is not within the scope of the
agreement, then there is no contract to arbitrate grievances con-
cerning it, and the presence or absence of a contract is for the court
to declare.
The simplicity of the logic ought not obscure its full implica-
tions. First, the courts in determining the scope must interpret
the terms of the agreement, and to this extent preempt the duties
of the arbitrator. Second, it gives the court the power in some
cases to adjudicate the merits of the grievance. 'Thus, in the
Belding Heminway ease the court and not the arbitrator deter-
mines whether the collective agreement provides the union this
protection against runaway shops-the very heart of the grievance.
Third, and most important, the logic is equally applicable to prob-
lems of scope other than geographical, 18 and few are the grievances
which cannot be expressed as problems in the scope of the
agreement.
The potential reach of the "scope" doctrine springs from the
theory frequently expressed by the courts that management retains
full freedom to manage its business except to the extent it has
agreed to limit that freedom by the collective agreement. The
agreement is a grant of rights to the union, and those not granted
are retained by management. Therefoite, when the union files a
grievance the only question is whether the right claimed by the
union is granted by the agreement. If it is not, then it falls outside
the "scope" of the agreement. For example, when a union
objected to an employer's compulsory retirement policy and sought
arbitration, the court granted the employer's motion to stay
arbitration. The court, after examining the agreement and the
negotiation history, found that the employer had not agreed to
surrender his power to compel retirement. Therefore the subject
18. Quite similar to the question of what geographical area is covered by the con-
tract is what employees are covered. Thus in Application of Graphite Metallizing Corp.,
271 App. Div. 839. 66 N. Y. S. 2d 53 (1946), the court held that the question whether a
grievance concerning an employee who had quit 6 months before the contract was made
could be arbitrated was'a question of scope for the courts.
The courts, however, sometimes refuse to apply this logic. In Matter of Royal
Typewriter Co. Inc., 15 L. A. 64 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1950), the contract, in defining the
bargaining unit, included "servicemen". After the contract was made the Company
began handling electric typewriters, which required special servicemen with entirely
different skills. The Company contended that these servicemen were not in the bar-
gaining unit, and sought to stay arbitration of a grievance concerning them. The
court refused to determine the scope of the contract but said, "whether the contract
covers servicemen working on electric typewriters . . . should be left to the arbitration
board." Similarly, in Bring Chevrolet Co. v. Aimalgamated Union Local 259, U. A. W.-
C. L 0., 16 L. A. 127 (N. Y. Sup. Ct, 1951), the court held that whether an employee
was a supervisor and therefore not covered by the contract was for the arbitrator.
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matter of the grievance was not within the "scope" of the
agreement.19
Starting with the narrowly worded power to determine
"whether an agreement to arbitrate was made", the courts have
implied the power to determine the "scope" of the agreement and
thereby created a device which enables them to supplant the arbi-
trator's function at will. While declaring themselves pawns they
hold the power of queens !
The second power asserted by the courts is the limited one of
determining the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. Since arbitration
is based upon contract, the parties cannot be compelled to arbitrate
nor be bound by an award except to the extent they have so
agreed.20 Therefore, the arbitrator's powers are confined to those
granted by the agreement, and it is the court's function not to pass
on the merits of the dispute but merely to keep arbitration within
this granted jurisdiction.2 '
To determine the question of jurisdiction the court must look
to the arbitration clause in the collective agreement. If the clause
is explicit either in granting or denying the arbitrator's power,
the court acts only as a pawn in enforcing its clear words. Thus,
the contract may expressly provide that increases in work loads
R" T'If19. General Electric Co. v. U.E.R. & M.W.A.-C.LO., 196 Misc. 143, 91 N. Yr. S.
2d 724 (Sup. Ct 1949). For a similar case in which the court used the same reason-
ing to aid it in coming to the same result, see American Federation of Grain Millers,
Local 110, A.F.L. v. Allied Mills, Inc., 196 Misc. 517, 91 N.Y.S. 2d 732 (Sup. Ct., 1949).
In Application of Hawley, 91 N.Y.S. 2d 723 (Sup. Ct, 1942), a grievance concerning
holidays and sick pay was held not arbitrable as "without the express scope of the
contract."
The impact of these decisions is not lessened by the fact that the court seems
to be holding only that the subject matter generally is not covered by the contract. In
the General Electric case the court said the parties had made no agreement concerning
compulsory retirement, completely ignoring the fact that the problem was one of
tenure of employment, which was extensively covered by the contract. The court,
while using language of "scope" is actually interpreting the seniority and discharge for
cause provisions of the agreement.
20. In pre-arbitration proceedings the question for the courts is whether -there
has been a failure to comply with the arbitration agreement. (C.P.A. § 1450). If the
grievance is outside the jurisdiction of the arbitrator there is no duty to submit to
arbitration and hence no failure to comply. In post-arbitration proceedings the ques-
tion is whether the arbitrator in making his award "exceeded his powers", (C.P.A.§ 1462) or in other words exceeded his jurisdiction. In either case the court's function
of determining jurisdiction rem:in the same.
21. The courts have almost unanimously held that the arbitrator can not determine
his own jurisdiction. To do so would allow him to lift himself by his own bootstraps.
Since the courts by determining the arbitrator's jurisdiction also determine their own,
there seems to be no equivalent limitation on judicial self-propulsion. See, for example,
Publisher's Ass'n. of N. Y_ v. Simons, 196 Misc. 88, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 782 (Sup. Ct., 1949).,
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LABOR ARBITRATION
shall be the subject of arbitration,22 or that disputes on wage
reopenings shall not be subject to arbitration.' The court in such
cases does not, by determining jurisdiction, reach the merits of
the controversy. However, the arbitration clause may cloak sub-
stantive rights in terms of jurisdiction. Thus provisions may
state that discharges for sub-standard work, or for failure to ob-
tain government clearance to work on classified data shall not be
the subject of a grievance or arbitration. Although phrased in
terms of jurisdiction such clauses simply define what shall con-
stitute discharge for cause. When the court stays arbitration it
determines that the person was discharged for the reason claimed
and that such a discharge was justified under the agreement. 24
Arbitration clauses, however, are seldom so explicit. Al-
though the precise terms may vary, they fall into two general
groups. The most common types restrict the arbitrator to "in-
terpreting and applying the agreement" and frequently includes
the redundant warning that the arbitrator "shall not add to, sub-
tract from, or modify the agreement." The second type is more
broadly phrased, submitting to the arbitrator "any dispute or
grievance arising between the parties." With such clauses the
court's task of defining the arbitrator's jurisdiction becomes more
complex, but the courts have rewarded themselves handsomely for
their extra labors.
In Western Union Telegraph Company v. American Coin-flm ications Association," employees who refused to handle tele-
grams transmitted to 'Western Union by non-striking employees
of other companies on strike were discharged for engaging in a
stoppage. The arbitrator ordered reinstatement, holding that in
the light of the custom of the trade that employees were not re-
22. Silcox v. Julliard & Co., 15 L. A. 668 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1950) (motion to stay
denied).
23. For cases involving reopening, see note 26 infra.
24. Berglas v. Shadel, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 425 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (motion to stay granted).;
Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. Engineers Ass'n., - App. Div. -, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 597 (1st
Dep't, 1951). See also In re Federation of Metropolitan Architects, 12 L. A. 852 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct, 1949). In Oppenheim Collins Co. v. Display Union, Local 144, C.I.O., 73
N. Y. S. 2d 673 (Sup. Ct., 1947), the employer dismissed window trimmers and assigned
their work to other employees for claimed business reasons. The court stayed arbitra-
tion because the contract provided that dismissal for business reasons "shall be in the
sole discretion of the Employer", and thereby impliedly excluded this grievance from
the arbitrator's jtuisdiction. This foreclosed the main issue-whether the business
reason was bona fide. In Curry v. Reddich, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 674 (Sup. Ct, 1949), the
court extended this reasoning another step. The union protested the employer's sub-
contracting the work of* one department and laying off employees in that department.
The court held that in the absence of any provision against subcontracting, this was
within management's inherent prerogatives and therefore excluded from the arbitrator'sjurisdiction.
25. 299 N. Y. 177. 86 ". F..2d 162 (1949).
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quired to handle "hot traffic", there had been no "stoppage"
within the meaning of that term of the agreement. The Court of
Appeals held that the word "stoppage" could not be so inter-
preted, and included refusal to handle struck work. Since the
arbitrator's power *-as limited to interpreting the agreement, he
had exceeded his jurisdiction. The logic is again simple. Since
the power to interpret does not include the power to misinterpret,
any misinterpretation falls outside the jurisdiction of the arbitra-
tor. The court, to determine whether the arbitrator has stayed
within his jurisdiction must, therefore, interpret the agreement.
With this bit of magic logic the arbitrator is dethroned and the
cane of a pawn becomes the sceptre of a queen.26
Under a more broadly phrased arbitration clause the logic is
lengthened, but the result is the same. Since the arbitration clause
is an integral part of the collective agreement and the parties do
not intend that the arbitrator shall have the power to remake their
agreement, he must keep within the framework of the agreement
and be governed by its provisions. The terms of the agreement
again become the limits of the arbitrator's jurisdiction, and the
court under the cloak of jurisdiction interprets the agreement.
Thus in Application of Berger,7 the union protested the lay-off
of a whole department due to sub-contracting by the employer
and sought arbitration. The court interpreted the discharge,
seniority, and management prerogative clauses of the agreement
and found no provision prohibiting this layoff. It therefore re-
fused to compel arbitration in spite of the clause that "any griev-
ances or disputes" were subject to arbitration.
26. Defining the jurisdiction of the arbitrator does not always adjudicate the merits
of the principal dispute. Thus determining that a dispute on wage reopening is ar-
bitrable does not settle the wage issue, but leaves the merits to the arbitrator. However,
the courts are reluctant to grant the arbitrator this power utless the contract explicitly
provides for arbitration of this issue. Towns and James v. Barasch, 197 Misc. 1022,
96 N. Y. S. 2d 32 (Sup. Ct., 1950); McCarten v. Brooklyn Bridge Freezing & Cold
Storage Co., 81 N. Y. S. 2d 494 (Sup Ct., 1948); Vasck v. Mathews, 79 N. Y. S.
2d 5 (Sup. Ct, 1947) ; Application of Berger, 191 Misc. 870, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 940 (Sup. Ct,
1948). Even though arbitration is explicitly provided it will be narrowly construed.
Publishers Ass'n of N. Y. v. Simons, supra n. 21, ("revision of basic wage rates" held
not to include health and welfare benefits).
Similarly determining the arbitrator's jurisdiction to reduce a discipline penalty
does not adjudicate the merits directly, although it may leave the union remediless and
in effect uphold the employer's decision. Again the courts seem chary about giving
the arbitrator this power unless it is expressly granted. In re American Safety Razor
Corp., 280 App. Div. 800, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 232 (3rd Dep't 1951) ; In re Silber, 13 L A.
733 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1949); Modernage Furniture Co. v. Weitz, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 467
(Sup. Ct., 1946); Atlantic Basin Iron Works v. Independent Union of Marine and
Shipbuilding Workers, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 660 (Sup. Ct, 1945).
27. 191 Misc. 1043, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 528 (Sup. Ct., 1948). For a similar, if not
more extreme case of judicial interpretation of the contract, see Twentieth Century-Fox
ilm Corp. v. Screen Publicists Guild, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 178 (Sup. Ct., 1948).
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The courts' indifference to the wording of the arbitration
clause is suggested by an examination of approximately 100 cases
involving the extent of the arbitrator's power. In nearly two-
thirds of those cases the court did not even mention the arbitra-
tion clause, nor was the arbitrator's power upheld any more
frequently under broad than under narrow clauses. Regardless of
the wording of the clause, the arbitrator's jurisdiction will almost
always be limited to interpreting and applying the terms of the
agreement. Only in exceptional cases where the intent of the par-
ties is extremely clear will the court allow the arbitrator to go
beyond the terms of the agreement.2
This does not mean that the courts uniformly usurp the
power of arbitrators to interpret the agreement. In a number of
cases the courts have recognized that there may be more than one
reasonable interpretation of a disputed provision,2 9 and have
occasionally given more than lip service to the proposition that
arbitrators have the power to make mistakes.30 However, these
cases in labor arbitration are distinctly in the minority. Their
presence should not obscure the fact that the power to determine
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is the power to supplant him in
interpreting the agreement. Any limitations on this power spring
less from logic than from self-restraint.
Even simpler and surer than the logic of "scope" and "juris-
diction" is the magic phrase "nothing to arbitrate." The courts
will not compel arbitration unless there is a dispute, but if the
meaning of the contract is clear and free from doubt there is no
dispute, and therefore nothing to arbitrate.3' This rule roots in
28. Plymouth Rock Transportation Corp. v. O'Rourke, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 160 (Sup.
Ct, 1951) (special submission to settle strike) ; Sainet v. Rutledge Dry Cleaning Corp.,
15 L. A. 671 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1950) (rate subject to arbitration under comprehensive
agreement) ; Association of Master Painters v. Brotherhood of Painters, 64 N. Y. S.
2d 405 (Sup. Ct., 1946) (fixing of overtime hours expressly granted to arbitration
board). However, in In re Simons, 13 L. A. 482 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1949) the court
vacated an award of the arbitration board which revised the seniority structure even
though the revision was necessary to avoid unfair labor practice charges and both
union and management representatives were members of the board and helped work
out the new seniority system.
29. In re New York World Telegram Corp., 17 L. A. 406 (N. Y. Sup. Ct, 1951);
North American Phillips Co. Inc. v. L A. M., 16 L. A. 275 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1951):
Local 74, National Food Chain Store Employees v. Safeway Stores, 79 N. Y. S. 2d
493 (Sup. Ct, 1948).
30. Matter of Motor Haulage, supra n. 12; Allen v. Jayne, 279 A. D. 444, 110
N. Y. S. 2d 609 (1st Dep't, 1952) ; In re Ponton Inc., 102 N. Y. S. 2d 445 (Sup. Ct,
1950); Application of Davis, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 387 (Sup. Ct, 1945). "
31. If there is nothing to arbitrate there can, of course, be no agreement to ar-
bitrate and "failure to comply therewith" under C.P-. § 1450. Therefore, the court
will not compel but will stay arbitration.
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International Association of Machinists v. Cutler Hammer Inc."
itself a revealing case. The collective agreement provided for a
6% bonus for the last six months of 1945 and then stated, "The
Company agrees to meet with the union early in July 1946 to dis-
cuss payment of a bonus for the first six months of 1946." The
Company did meet with the union, but refused to pay any bonus
for 1946. The union claimed that the contract contemplated that
some bonus would be paid but left open the amount. Judge Shein-
tag, then on the Supreme Court, granted the union an order com-
pelling arbitration. The Appellate Division, by a divided court,
reversed, stating:
"The mere assertion by a party of a meaning of a provision
which is clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the words
can not make an arbitrable issue. It is for the court to deter-
mine whether the contract contains a provision for arbitra-
tion of the dispute tendered and in the exercise of that juris-
diction the court must decide whether there is such a dispute.
If the meaning of the provision of the contract sought to be
arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to
arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to provide for ar-
bitration."33
The court then found that the contract was "so clear" and the
union's claim "so untenable" that there was no dispute and noth-
ing to arbitrate. The Court of Appeals, with two judges dissent-
ing, affirmed.3 4 In spite of the dispute between the judges, the
meaning of the clause was "beyond dispute" !
This rule plunges the courts directly into contract interpre-
tation, the very heart of arbitration. The courts have not re-
stricted themselves to determining whether the claim was so
pDatentlv frivolous or unconscionable that the bringing of it was in
bad faith and an abuse of the arbitration process.35 On the con-
32. 297 N. Y. 519, 74 N. E. 2d 464 (1947).
33. 271 App. Div. 917, 918, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 317, 318 (1st Dept., 1947).
34. The majority affirmed without opinion: Judge Fuld, dissenting with Judge
Desmond, said (page 520):
"A claim may be so unconscionable or a defense so frivolous as to justify the
court in refusing to order the parties to proceed to arbitration, but I do not so regard
the claim here asserted . . . It may well be argued, and in good faith, that in the light
of surrounding circumstances and of experience in the industry, and indeed in this
very business, respondent company agreed that a bonus would be paid. If there is a
possibility of such construction, the court should not remove the controversy from the
sphere of arbitration, particularly when the applicable arbitration clause is so broad . . .
In short, I think there is something to arbitrate."
35. Frivolous cases may be pushed to arbitration occasionally for any number of
reasons. A few reported cases seem to be of that type, although the report is frequently
sketchy and must always be recognized as a self-serving statement by the court. See
for example, In re Ryerson, 17 L. A. 319 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1951) ; Malter of Straus
Stores Corp., 189 Misc. 428, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 315 (Sup. Ct., 1947). For a suspicious
looking case, see Dumont Electric Corp. v. Cliff, 17 L. A. 319 (1951).
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trary they have spun fine lines of reasoning to prove ostensibly
ambiguous clauses unambiguous, 36 delved into obscure and equivo-
cal negotiation history to discover the in-disputable intent of the
parties, 7 and ingeniously manipulated overlapping and conflict-
ing clauses to resolve all doubts.38 Far more clear than the mean-
ing of the agreement is the fact that the court is engaged in doing
the very job of interpretation assigned to the arbitrator. After
doing the arbitrator's job, they declare there is "nothing fo arbi-
trate".
The court can use this "nothing to arbitrate" rule only to
deny the claim of one seeking arbitration, for if the court finds the
grievance meritorious, it cannot grant an award but can only order.
arbitration. However, the court is not left powerless, for in order-
ing arbitration it can easily indicate' its interpretation of the
agreement. 39 Quixotic would be the arbitrator who dared ignore
the hint! His award would be short-lived-a victim of the
Western Union rule that a clearly erroneous interpretation is
without jurisdiction, and therefore void.
The only limitation on the courts in finding there is no dispute
is their own humility. An agreement is ambiguous only so long
as the judge can admit that his own interpretation is disputable.
The very existence of the rule that courts -will not compel arbi-
tration of a clause that is clear, inevitably draws them into the
interpretation process. Once involved, they reach conclusions as
to the meaning of the agreement and become persuaded of their
rightness. To then find a dispute present is to admit the likeli-
hood of their own error. This is more than most courts can do.
36. See, for example, Matter of General Electric Co. and U.E.R. & M.W.A.-C.LO.,
300 Nq. Y. 262, 90 N. E. 2d 181 (1949); American Federation of Grain Millers, Local
360 v. International Milling Co., 13 L. A. 755 (1949) ; Application of Sohmer & Co,
89 N. Y. S. 2d 214 (1949) ; Publishers Ass'n of N. Y. v. Simons, supra, n. 21.
37. See, e. g., American Federation of Grain Millers, Local 110, A.F.L. v. Allied
Mills Inc., supra n. 19; General Electric Co. v. U.E.R. & M.W.A.-C.I.O., (1949) supra
n. 19.
38. See, e. g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Screen Publicists Guild Local
No. 114, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 178 (Sup. Ct., 1948). Application of Berger, 191 Misc. 1043:
78 N. Y. S. 2d 528 (Sup. Ct., 1948); In re Western Union Telegraph Co., 16 I. A.
721 (1951).
In some cases the court stayed arbitration of the union's grievance after
examining the whole contract and finding nothing curtailing the freedom of manage-
ment. Bohlinger v. National Cash Register Co., - App. Div. _, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 46
(1st Dept., 1952); Carborundum Co. v. Wagner, 198 Misc. 24, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 278
(Sup. Ct.. 1950).
39. See, e. g.,, In re 150 William Street Corp., 15 L A. 461 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1950);
Silcox v. Julliard & Co.- supra n. 22.
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One further basis for judicial intervention needs to be men-
tioned. The courts will not allow the arbitration process to be
used to enforce agreements which are either illegal or contrary to
public policy. Thus, the Court of Appeals struck down an award
based upon an interpretation of the agreement which permitted
stoppages violating the penal laws.40 Applying the same prin-
ciple, a lower court refused to compel arbitration where the
union's claim was based on a union security provision which the
court found violated the NATIOyAL LAOR R LATIOxs ACT. 41  The
soundness of the rule ought not obscure the fact that when the
court stays arbitration, as contrasted with when it vacates an
award, it must first interpret the agreement, for the legality of the
provision depends upon its meaning. This again plunges the
courts into the intricacies of contract construction, the special
responsibility of the arbitrator.'
The courts' power to supervise labor arbitration rests on nar-
row grants in the ARB1r1ATIOx- LAW. These grants, on their face,
bar the courts from deciding the merits of the grievance, and the
courts repeatedly assert that they cannot prevent or correct
"errors of judgment as to law or to fact." The courts' limited
power is to keep the arbitration process within the boundaries
prescribed by the parties; to protect the parties from arbitration
to which they have not agreed. This logically requires them to
determine the scope of the contract, the jurisdiction of the arbi-
trator, and the existence of a dispute. Each of these, in turn, be-
comes a device for extensive judicial control. The scope of the
contract is redefined as the rights granted by the contract; thejurisdiction of the arbitrator includes only the correct interpreta-
tion of the agreement; and clauses ambiguous to the parties be-
40. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. American Communicalions Association, supra
n. 25. For a precursor of this rule, see Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees
Union, Local 830, 170 Misc. 482, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 519 (Sup. Ct, 1939).
In a recent case the court extended this principle to strike down an award
of a $5,000 penalty for a strike in breach of contract. The court held that penalty
damages for breach of contract were contrary to public policy and vacated this portion
of the award. Publishers Ass'n of New York City v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers
Union, 285 App. Div. 500 (1st Dep't, 1952), noted BUFFALO LAW Rvrmw, this issue, p. 157.
41. ,1atter of Levinsohn Corp., 273 App. Div. 469, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 171 (1st Dep't,
1948) ; Accord, Barker v. Barile, 25 L.R.R.M. 2527 (N. Y. Sup. Ct, 1950). The court
assumes without discussing that it is empowered in such a proceeding to interpret the
NATIoAL LABOR RELATiOmS Acr and to aid in its enforcement.
42. See, e. g., Application of Baker, 85 N. Y. S. 2d 193 (Sup. Ct., 1948) ; Appli-
cation of Feller, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 852 (Sup. Ct, 1948). In both cases the court ordered
arbitration but only after elaborately construing the health and welfare clauses to find
them not in conflict with the Taft-Hartley Act. In both cases the court seemed more
intent on making the contract provisions fit the statute than determining the meaning
intended by the parties.
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come indisputably clear to the judge. Thus the courts can inter-
pret the contract, determine the merits, leaving to the arbitrator
only his honorary title. By staying arbitration the courts can even
deprive the arbitrator of his right to first guess.
The courts have not been reluctant to use the power thus made
available. Nearly 100 reported cases have been found in NTew
York in which the courts have been asked to review the sulstan-
tive issues of grievances under union-management agreements
containing arbitration clauses. In nearly 60% of these cases the
courts have used one or more of the devices discussed above to
decide either directly or indirectly the merits of the grievance,
and in 40 of these cases the courts refused even to allow the case
to go to arbitration. In only 16 cases did the courts confirm and
enforce the award of the arbitrator, 3 and not all of these against
their better judgment on the merits.4
"And what is this on my head ?" she exclaimed
in a tone of dismay . . . "But how can it have
gotten there without my knowing it?" she said
to herself as she took it off and set it on her lap
to make out what it could possibly be.
It was a golden crown.45
Ii.
"And, how exactly like an egg he is !" she said aloud,
standing with her hands ready to catch him, for she
was every moment expecting him to fall. "Its very
provoking," said Humpty Dumpty, "to be called an
egg-very!" "I said you looked like an egg, Sir,"
Alice gently explained, "and some eggs are very
pretty, you know," she added, hoping to turn her re-
mark into sort of a compliment. "Some people,"
said Humpty Dumpty, "have no more sense than a
baby !"46
In the Looking Glass World of labor arbitration the courts,
like Alice, are deceived by appearances. They are never quite
able to resist using names appropriate only for the world of their
43. In 25 other cases the court refused to stay arbitration. This does not necessarily
mean that the decision of the arbitrator will be upheld, for the court could still vacate
the award. However, no reported cases of this type have been found.
44. In a number of cases the courts while confirming the award have reviewed
the merits and indicated their agreement with the arbitrator's award. See, e. g., In re
United Pencil Workers Local Industrial Union, No. 934 C. I. 0., 16 L. A. 179 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct., 1951).
45. Supra n. 1, page 165.
46. Id. at 105.
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own. The collective agreement looks so much like an ordinary
contract that by calling it such.the courts feel safely at home. But
the two are quite different, and the failure to see this has led to
much trouble.4 7
First, the collective agreement differs from the common con-
tract in the complexity of the relationship which it concerns. The
ordinary contract deals with only a single transaction or a small
segment of business activity and involves terms which can be de-
fined and fixed. In contrast, the employment relationship in
modern industry involves a multitude of terms sometimes cover-
ing thousands of employees doing hundreds of different jobs and
receiving dozens of different rates of pay. This complexity is mul-
tiplied by constant changes in the number of men worling, the
processes used, and the products produced. While the relation-
ship is complex, the collective agreement must be simple, for it
should be distributed to and used by every employee that it gov-
erns. Furthermore, the collective agreement does not, like a con-
tract, create the relationship which it governs. Instead it is super-
imposed upon an existing pattern and operates within the em-
ployer's framework of industrial organization and established
practices. Its provisions can deal only with the most troublesome
parts but may assume a continuation of many procedures and
practices left untouched by the agreement.
The collective agreement is designed to meet the special needs
presented. In contrast to the common contract, it does not pre-
tend to state all of the terms between the parties with precision,
hardness, or completeness. Many details are omitted, and flexi-
bility may be left to permit needed change. The collective agree-
ment includes manv broad rules and standards which serve but as
guides to the parties in working out day by day their total rela-
tionship. The lack of definiteness and completeness is made up
by the creation of the grievance proce.dure through which the par-
ties can continue their process of bargaining.
Second, a collective agreement differs from the common con-
tract in that it deals with an essentially compulsory relationship.
In ordinarv contracts the parties are free to contract or not as they
please, and usually have a choice with whom they deal. But the
union and management do not have this same freedom of choice.
They are inextricably wedded to each other, are compelled by law
47. For an intensive and instructive study of the special characteristics of collective
agreements and the need for special legal handling of problems arising out of them,
see Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining And The Concept of Contracts, 48 COL. L. REV.
829 (1948).
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to deal with each other, and are driven by necessity ultimately to
agree. Delay in agreement is costly, and the goal sought by both
is a period of peace. Thus the parties' desire to avoid or end a
strike may far outweigh some of the lesser demands, but out-
right surrender by either may be psychologically or politically im-
possible. Because of this, once the major issues are settled an
agreement is frequently written which leaves minor disputes un-
decided. Gaps are intentionally left, and clear coihimitments
avoided. Negotiations cannot deal with all potential problems,
the effects of provisions cannot all be foreseen, and many vague
understandings cannot be expressed in writing. The agreement
when signed leaves much yet unsettled, for peace cannot wait while
small points are quibbled. On these the parties may simply agree
to agree. They thus postpone minor issues to be settled in the
future by the peaceful procedures prescribed in the agreement.4 8
This compulsion reaches the whole of the relationship between
the parties, for they must live together or not at all. When the
strike is ended, the entire employment relationship is resumed.
Therefore, the settlement must either expressly or impliedly reach
every aspect of that relationship. The written document may con-
tain few express provisions but the agreement must inevitably
determine the extent to which each party is bound and the extent
to which each remains free to use its economic strength. The ab-
sence of provisions implies either a silent assumption of duties
or a retention of freedom to act. No matter how -unclear, -it in-
evitably speaks.
By calling a collective agreement a contract the courts have
glossed over its complex and compulsory character. As a result
they have frequently lost sight of the function of labor arbitra-
tion and have often been deaf to its special alemands.
In holding that certain subject matter is beyond the scope of
the contract because it is not explicitly mentioned, the courts bar
arbitration to. determine what the parties have impliedly agreed.
The fact that the written document contains no provisions con-
cerning paid holidays and sick pay does not mean that these issues
have not been reached by the settlement. The silence may speak
of an intent to agree that management retains its discretion, or per-
48. As George W. Taylor has said, "An important key to understanding grievance
arbitration is to realize that while collective bargaining starts with the negotiation of
an agreement, it necessarily continues in the settlement of many grievances_. . . Griev-
ance settling by its nature fills out the understandings expressed iii the colntract which
are inherently incomplete." The Voluntary Arbitration of Labor Disputes in Law and
Labor Management Relations (University of Michigan, 1950) p. 198-9.
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haps of an intent that established customs continue. 49 But the in-
tent drawn from silence is a part of the agreement, and the arbi-
trator's function is to determine its meaning whether implied
from silence or explicit provisions. By staying arbitration the
courts prevent the arbitrator from fulfilling his function. By find-
ing that the subject is beyond the scope of the contract they hold
that management still retains its discretion without facing square-
ly the critical question whether this was the result intended by the
parties.
Likewise the courts may determine that certain disputes are
beyond the arbitrator's jurisdiction without being aware of the
impact of this on the relationship of the parties. In Towns d'
Janmes v. Barasch," the union sought to arbitrate a wage reopen-
ing dispute. Although the agreement provided a broad arbitra-
tion clause and the parties had previously arbitrated this matter,
the court held that wage reopenings were beyond the arbitrator'sjurisdiction. It cited as authority prior decisions involving other
parties under differently worded agreements."' It seemed utterly
unaware that denial of arbitration meant that either the union was
rendered helpless by a no-strike clause, or that the dispute could be
settled only by a strike which would break the peace established by
the agreement. The parties may have intended neither of these
alternatives, but may have prized an extended period of peace
with a method available to make needed adjustments.12  This can-
not be determined by using expletives of "no jurisdiction" or by
citing judicial precedents. It is simply a question of how the two
parties involved intended this future dispute should be settled.
The fact that the arbitrator must add new terms or change old
ones should be no insuperable obstacle, for he is but the final step
in the grievance procedure which is created by the parties for the
very purpose of completing and adapting the skeletal terms of
49. In Application of Hawley, supra n. 19, the court held that "in view bf theparticularized and detailed nature of the contract" holiday pay and sick leave were
not arbitrable. Although phrased in terms of "outside the express scope of the contract"the decision was obviously that the parties had agreed that management retained fulldiscretion on this matter, and therefore the grievance was without merit. For similar
cases involving compulsory retirement, see General Electric Co. v. U.E.R. & M.W.A.-C.LO., supra n. 19; and American Federation of Grain Millers, Local 110 A.F.L. v.Allied Mills Inc., supra n. 19.
50. 197 Misc. 1022, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 32 (Sup. Ct., 1950).
51. Without any serious inquiry into the intent of the parties, the courts in NewYork have developed a body of precedent which states as a rule 'of law that wage
reopenings are not arbitrable unless clearly stated in the agreement. See the cases
cited in note 26 supra.
52. See, e. g., In re Dumas, 12 L. A. 243 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1949) where parties
expressly provided for arbitration of reopening of wages, hours, and working conditions,
thus making clear a high preference for peace.
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the agreement. If the arbitrator has no jurisdiction, the only
other resort is a strike. Such an intent is not to be lightly in-
ferred.
In interpreting the terms of the collective agreement the
courts have been equally obsessed with concepts appropriate only
to common contracts in which terms are stated with directness
and precision. In one case- the union sought to arbitrate a dis-
charge under a clause which made "any dispute . ..as to any
matter" subject to arbitration. The court stayed arbitration on
the grounds that nothinz in the agreement expressly limited the
employer's power of discharge. Therefore there was no violation
of any obligation and nothing to arbitrate.13 In another case the
union protested the refusal of the employer to continue granting
sick leave as he had in the past. The court again stayed arbitra-
tion because no sick leave provision was included in the agree-
ment. 4 In both of these cases, the court barred arbitration and
thereby held that the employer is bound only by what is explicitly
written-a requirement that is unreal for collective agreements.
In a discharge case the arbitrator found the employee "not with-
out fault" but ordered the penalty reduced to reinstatement with
partial back pay. The court held that the arbitrator exceeded his
powers because he "compromised the controversy." ' In another
discharge case the arbitrator found only one out of ten counts
charged against the employee well-founded and ordered reinstate-
ment without back pay. The court again vacated the award.
Since the arbitrator found the employee guilty, he must enforce
the discharge ! This approach is more fitting for determining
breaches of contract than for the process of adjusting disputes
between parties to a collective agreement.5 7
The collective agreement differs as much from the common
contract as Humpty Dumpty differs from a common egg. The
53. Bohlinger v. National Cash Register Co., supra n. 38. This case is not alonebut represents a group of cases in which the court gave the employer an almost-entirely
free hand because no provision explicitly restricted the specific exercise of discretion.
See, for example the cases cited in notes 19, 24, and 38 supra.
54. Application of Toznzs & James, 183 Misc. 181, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 81 (Sup. Ct.,
1944).
55. In re Silber supra n. 26.
56. Modernage Furniture Co. v. Weitz, supra n. 26. Accord, In re American SafetyRazor Corp., supra n. 26. A far more realistic attitude is illustrated by Atlantic Basin
Iron Works v. Industrial Union of .Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, supra, n. 26. There
the court held the arbitrator could determine not only the guilt of the employee but the
reasonableness of the penalty, as the severity of the penalty could also be a "dispute or
controversy" within the arbitration clause.
57. For a discussion of the dangers of these decisions see Gray, Nature and Scope
of Arbitration and Arbitration Clauses, in First Annual Conference on Labor Law (New
York University, 1948) p. 211.
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failure of the courts to see and remember the differences causes
confusion and leads them to blunder. They misconceive the re-
lationship, hobble arbitration, and misinterpret the agreement,
and defeat the intent of the parties-all because they forget they
are in a world quite unlike their own."
"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,"
Alice objected. "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty
said in a rather scornful tone, "It means just what I
choose it to mean,--neither more nor less." "The ques-
tion is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean
so many different thin-gs. "The question is," saidHumpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all.""9
The courts' insistence that a collective agreement is "exactlylike" a contract is matched by their insistence that common words
must have common meanings. Like Alice, they object whenfamiliar words are used in strange ways, forgetting that in thisLooking Glass World the parties make words mean just what they
choose them to mean, neither more nor less. For example, in theWestern Union case the agreement provided that there shouldbe no" stoppages' 2.60 The arbitrator found that because of a custom
of the trade that employees could refuse to handle struck work,
the refusal in this case to handle messages coming from strucklines was no "stoppage" within the meaning of the agreement.
The Court of Appeals, however, -was certain that "stoppage"
must mean stoppage, and the parties could not make it meansomething else,-'"the language is unambiguous, the words plain
and clear, conveying a distinct idea."'" The parties would not
even be allowed to explain or prove what they meant, for they
58. For a vigorous denunciation of what the author means "judicial meddling", seeMayer, Judicial Bulls in the Delicate China Shop of Labor Arbitration, 2 LABOR L. J.
503 (1951).
59. Supra n. 1. at p. 114.
60. Supra, n. 25. Criticized 63 HARV. L. Rzv. 347 (1949).
61. The arbitrator's lot is not an easy one. In Matter of Universal Metal ProductsCo., 179 Misc. 1044, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 265 (Sup. Ct., 1943), the arbitrator refused to re-ceive evidence as to the intent of the parties because he felt that the provision was
clear on its face. This, said the cburt, was improper and vacated the award.In direct contrast to the Western Union case is Matter of Motor Haulage, stpran. 12. The contract provided that "No strikes, or lockouts or walkouts shall be ordered
or enforced by either party." A walkout occurred. The arbitrator did not find thatthe union "ordered" it or "enforced" it in the ordinary sense. He held, however, that
since large numbers participated with knowledge of the union, the union should be heldresponsible. This was within the meaning of "ordered or enforced" as used by theparties. The Appellate Division held that this award should be enforced in spite ofthe arbitrator's interpretation of these words.
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could not be masters of their own words."2 In Matter of General
Electric Company68 the Court of Appeals was even more self-
certain. The collective agreement prohibited discrimination for
union activity. It also provided that all time spent by union
stewards in settling grievances beyond eight hours a week should
be paid for by the union. The Company instituted a pension plan
but refused to allow pension credits to stewards for this extra
grievance time. The union claimed this prevented stewards from
earning full pension rights and therefore constituted discrimina-
tion because of union activity. The Court found there was "no
real ground of claim" and stayed arbitration. There could be no
"discrimination," for pension credits were given to all employees
alike on the basis of compensation paid by the Company. "Dis-
crimination" meant mathematically unequal. The parties could
not possibly have included in the term "discrimination" a practice
which indirectly deprived stewards of equal benefits and thereby
discouraged union members from taking that office. The under-
lying purpose of the provision nor the possible intent of the par-
ties could not change the meaning of the word !64
The courts assume in these cases that words are neat pack-
ages, each containing a fixed and identifiable meaning, and that
the courts need no help in reading the labels. Unfortunately, the
words in collective agreements are not so easily wrapped and tied.
Every industry has a dialect of its own, and though common words
are used they may carry uncommon meanings which differ
from industry to industry. The differences may not be bold, but
they are no less important, and are often more dangerous be-
cause of their subtleness. Each collective agreement is written
in the peculiar dialect of the parties, and each word bears the re-
flected colorations of the industry and the unspoken understand-
ings of the parties, for the usefulness of the agreement depends
upon the accuracy with which it expresses their common consent
62. Frequently the court is so certain that the words could mean only -one thing
that it stays arbitration, thereby preventing a full inquiry into their potential ambiguity.
See, e. g., Publishers Ass'n. of N. Y. v. Simons, 196 Misc. 888, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 782
(Sup. Ct., 1949) (reopening for "revision for basic wage rates" 6ould not include a
union demand for an increase for the purpose of giving its members pension and welfare
benefits) ; In re General Electric Co., 16 L. A. 719 (N.Y.S. Ct., 1951) ("absence" for
purposes of computing service credits must include refusal to work during lawful
strike).
63. 300 N. Y. 262, 90 N. E. 2d 181 (1949).
64. In a number of cases the courts have stayed arbitration because provisions
seemed clear on their *face although closer scrutiny of their purpose and the intent
of the parties might have raised substantial doubts whether their meaning was so precise
or certain. See, e. g., Application of Sohiner & Co., supra n. 36; American Federation
of Grain Millers, Local 360 v. International Milling Co., supra n. 36; Dumont Electric
Corp. v. Cliff, supra n. 14.
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in the language which they most readily understand. To impose
on the words thus written by the parties the meanings known by
the court is to rewrite the agreement and defeat the intent of theparties. The cases bear witness to the dangers involved.
This Alice-like attitude that words speak simply and singly
not only distorts the agreement but can destroy arbitration itself.It provides the unspoken premise which is used to extend "scope"
and "jurisdiction" to complete judicial control of the merits. The
rationale of those doctrines is that the parties are bound by arbi-
tration only to the extent to which they have so agreed, and that
the courts are to protect them from arbitration beyond these limits.The parties have consented to arbitration only within the terms
of the collective agreement. Therefore, the court must determine
the meaning of the collective agreement to discover the arbitrator 'spower. Tucked away out of sight is the premise that words are
simple, that clauses and provisions have single meanings, and
that there can be discovered the meaning of the agreement. Thispremise, of course, flies in the face of the whole structure of a
collective agreement which by its skeletal nature, its incomplete
negotiation, and its deliberate ambiguity is not intended to have
an indisputable meaning. The urgency for labor arbitration, aliartfrom settling purely factual disputes, arises from a sharp aware-
ness of the parties that their words might have multiple meanings.
Underlying the whole process of judicial review of labor arbi-tration lies two major misconceptions which permeate a majorportion of the court decisions. One is the misconception that a
collective agreement is a common contract and the other is the
misconception that the words and provisions in collective agree-
ments must carry common and fixed meanings. Both of these
spring from the courts' apparent inability to recognize the
strangeness of this world, and both result in an assumption of
authority which is exercised with extreme awkwardness.
Ei.
"Contrariwise" continued Tweedledee, "if it was so,
it might be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it
isn't, it ain't. That's logic." 65
The previous sections have described the extent to which the
courts have exdrted their control over labor arbitration, and havepointed out some of the delusions which have caused the courts
to blunder in reviewing arbitration cases. These, however, do not
reach the critical question-the extent to which the courts should
supervise labor arbitration. This question is seldom faced by the
65. SuPra n. 1 at p. 67.
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courts directly, although .it is implicit in every decision. When
faced, the answers are spelled out by careful deduction from un-
questioned premises. The courts declare that their function is to
enforce contracts to arbitrate. Therefore, they must determine
whether there is a contract to arbitrate and what powers are grant-
ed to the arbitrator. All of the rest logically follows,-determina-
tion of "scope", "jurisdiction", or "arbitrability". However,
such logic does not justify what the courts do, for it is based upon
a self-serving syllogism. The premise is merely the conclusion
stated in a more obscure form and the simplicity of the words
only conceals the smuggled assumptions. Nor can the answers
ever be provided by the logic of Tweedledee, for the problem is
not one of semantics but of practical need.
Labor arbitration is a part of the process of collective bar-
gaining; a procedure for administering an agreement and adjust-
ing disputes between the parties. The .question is the practical
one of the role which the courts should play in that procedure to
make it serve more adequately the needs of the parties.
The difficulty of the question springs from the fact that labor
arbitration itself rests upon a basic inconsistency. On the one
hand both union and management prize their freedom to bargain.
They demand the right to make their own agreement, and once
made they insist that no one shall change it. The strength of this
feeling is evidenced by the infrequency with which the parties
will arbitrate the making of an agreement and the. nearly unani-
mous objection of both parties to what is commonly known as
compulsory arbitration. Because of this deep-rooted attitude, the
parties usually insist that grievance arbitration be confined to
"interpretation and application" of the agreement. On the other
hand, one of the main reasons for arbitration is the failure of the
parties to make a completed agreement. No attempt is made to
provide explicitly for every potential dispute. On the contrary,
gaps may be intentionally left, ambiguous phrases deliberately
used, and minor problems left undiscussed. The agreement is
signed with both parties knowing full well that many problems
remain to be settled thro-agh the grievance procedure and by arbi-
tration if necessary. Thus, arbitration becomes the means for
completing the agreement. The parties themselves seldom see
clearly the inconsistency of demands which they make on the arbi-
tration process and it is this which the courts must discover.
The courts, in supervising labor arbitration, are faced with
the dilemma posed by these conflicting desires of the parties. If
the courts do not hold a check rein on arbitrators, the parties may
be fearful that their agreement will be remade and therefore hesi-
tate to use the arbitration process. But if the courts hold the reins
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too tightly, the arbitrator loses flexibility and his usefulness is
greatly decreased. No magic words or simple rules can resolve
this dilemma, for the court must balance the conflicting desires of
the parties. Underneath lies the vague and inarticulate under-
standing of the parties as to the role which the arbitrator should
play in working out their relationship. The courts must attempt in
each case to discover this intent, for the function of the court is
simply to fulfill in each case this expectation of the parties.
Obviously, the closeness of judicial control must vary widely
from agreement to agreement, for the relative strength of the
conflicting desires are seldom the same. Every arbitrator knows
that the parties under one agreement may want him only to con-
strue the explicit words of a provision, while other parties
under another agreement may want him to work out a solution
based on the total relationship. The role of the impartial chair-
man in a branch of the garment industry may be far different
from the role of a permanent umpire in the steel industry. Like-
wise, the function of an arbitrator may change as the relationship
of the parties matures. The words of the arbitration clause may
furnish some clue, but they are seldom clear and are never
divorced from the context of the entire relationship. The readi-
ness of the court to intervene must depend on these many subtle
factors.66
Judicial review of labor arbitration consists of the court sub-
stituting its decision for that of the arbitrator. The roles of the
court and the arbitrator are complementary, for the power of the
arbitrator fixes the helplessness of the court, and the control of
the court fixes the subservience of the arbitrator. Therefore, in
determining the extent to which the court should supervise arbitra-
tion it is necessary to compare the qualifications of courts and
arbitrators to make these decisions. Little should need be said on
this point, but the failure of the courts- to recognize their limita-
tions requires some reminders.
Most obvious, the courts are often unfamiliar with the whole
background of industrial processes and practices against which the
words of the collective agreement must be cast. They have diffi-
culty understanding the language of the parties, and too often fail
66. The total failure of the courts to understand the problem is most clearly re-
vealed by their practice of determining the power of the arbitrator by searching out
prior judicial decisions which involved other parties operating under different agree-
ments. Thus in To~ws & James v. Baraseh, supra n. 50, the court stayed arbitration of
a wage reopening on the authority of the Berger case, supra n. 26. This decision in
turn had been based on the Cutler Hammer case, supra n. 32. The court did not give
even a second thought to the p1ossibility that the relationship of the parties in these
three different industries might be radically different. Similarly in Application of Ber-
ger, supra n. 38, the court determined the scope of a management prerogative clause
by citing a decision involving Twentieth Century-Fox Films I
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to recognize the essential nature of the collective bargaining re-
lationship. For example, in Carborundum v. Wagner67 the agree-
ment provided for departmental seniority. The Company com-
bined two departments which had somewhat similar processes and
then assigned work on one process to men on the other depart-
mental seniority list. The court, apparently unaware of the im-
pact of this on the seniority structure, held that since the Company
did this to reduce costs and meet competition this was permitted
by the management rights. This interlretation was so indisputa-
ble that arbitration would be stayed as there was nothing to arbi-
trate! The blunders of the court may sometimes be unbearable.
Thus in one ease the court interpreted a number of interrelated
clauses dealing with discharge, layoff and severance pay. The
court spelled out the meaning of these clauses in detail and held
that the meaning was so clear that arbitration would be stayed.
The parties, to salvage the situation, agreed to and signed a let-
ter stating their intended meaning of these provisions which was
quite different from that of the court. Unfortunately, even their
letter contained an ambiguity on one point and they again ended in
court. Undaunted, the judge found these words clear and again
stayed arbitration. There is no report of the parties returning for
a third round !68
In contrast, most arbitrators are reasonably familiar with the
practices of the industry in which they arbitrate, understand the
special language of the parties, and appreciate the nature of the
collective agreement. Many have wide experience in arbitrating,
frequently have handled previous cases for the parties, and may
be highly skilled specialists in the field. They have an expertness
which tle courts can seldom match.69
The arbitrator has a further advantage over the courts. He is
not bound by formal judicial procedures, nor are his hearings
restrained by rigid rules of evidence. 0 In the informal give and
take of argument he may see better the broader implications of
the narrow problem presented, see more fully the relationship of
the parties, fit his decision more closely with their basic intent. The
cold formality of a courtroom, the restrictive rules of evidence,
and legalistic arguments presented by .ounsel in terms of "juris-
67. 198 Misc. 24, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 278 (Sup. Ct, 1950).
68. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Screen Publicists Guild, Local No. 114,
supra n. 38. For a case in which the court apparently failed completely to understand
the issue under dispute until corrected on rehearing, see In re General Electric, supra
n. 62.
69. See UPDEGRAF & McCoy, ARrrATioN OF LABOR DisPuTES (1946) p. 17.
70. See Singer, Labor Arbitration, Use of Legal Rules of Evidence, 2 LABOR L. J.
185 (1951).
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diction" or "arbitrability" are scarcely adapted to solving dis-
putes arising out of collective agreements.
Most important of all the arbitrator's qualifications is thefact that he is the product of the parties' free choice. The parties
by agreeing to arbitration indicate a preference for that method of
settling their disputes.71 They establish it as the administrative
process best suited to their needs.
The fact that an arbitrator is an expert aided by a free pro-
cedure and vested with power by the consent of the parties does
not mean that the courts should exercise no supervisory function.
The parties' consent is but a limited one, and they need some
assurance of protection from an arbitrator who may run amuck.
Furthermore, judicial review has a preventative as well as cura-
tive value. Its very presence keeps arbitrators aware that their
power is limited and reduces the temptation to play god for theparties. The need is not for judicial abdication, but for judicial
restraint. The court should give full recoznition to the expertness
of the arbitrator and due deference to the choice of the parties,
and substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator only whenhe was so palpably wrong that to allow his decision to stand would
undermine confidence in the arbitration process itself. The test.however, can not be embodied in immutable words, for it is an atti-
tude of tolerance and humility, not a mathematical formula.
The standard of judicial review for labor arbitration shouldbe much the same as the standard used in reviewing the findings
of administrative agencies.7 2 The collective agreement is a form
of legislation stating the rules that govern the parties' relation-
ship.7" The grievance procedure, ending in arbitration, provides
71. Not 'only do the parties choose the arbitration process, but in most casesthey also choose the arbitrator himself. If they can not agree on an arbitrator, thecourt may appoint one. C.P.A. § 1453. In re Fever Transportation Co., 295 N. Y. 87,65 N. E. 2d 178 (1946). However, such cases are extremely rare. The arbitrator isusually selected only after very careful inquiry into his ability and attitudes. Whetherthe arbitrator is appointed ad hoc or is a so-called permanent umpire, he continues to
serve only so long as he satisfies the parties. MacDonald, The Selection and Tenure ofArbitrators in Labor Disputes, in First Annual Conference on Labor Law (New York
University, 1948) p. 145.
72. Although decisions of administrative agencies consist predominantly of findings
of fact, and decisions of arbitrators consist predominantly of interpretation of the agree-
ment, both can be subjected to the same broad test: namely, whether the decision hasany rational basis. The federal courts have recognized that review of administrativeinterpretations of statutes may be limited to determining whether there is any reasonablebasis. Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402 (1941); N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, 322U. S. 111 (1944). However, compare the New York attitude as expressed in New YorkPost v. Kelly, 296 N. Y. 178, 71 N. E. 2d 456 (1947).
73. For a careful analytical study of the legislative character of collective agree-
ments see Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American LegalSystem, 39 MicH. L. REv. 1109 (1941).
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the mechanics for administering the law of the parties.74 The
needs for judicial control and the reasons for judicial restraint
are quite similar. The standards are equally impossible to define
with precision, but require of the courts the greatest forbearance
appropriate to their limited function.5
The failure of the courts to recognize their restricted role is
most marked when judicial protection is sought by one of the par-
ties prior to arbitration, either by resisting an application to com-
pel or by seeking an order to stay arbitration. Over two-thirds of
the cases in which the parties are contesting the merits of the
grievance come into court at this pre-arbitration stage. If the
court stays arbitration, as it does in more than half of these cases,
it completely supplants the arbitrator." More than that, the
court enforces its interpretation of the agreement without even
permitting the arbitrator to give it the benefit of his findings and
expert opinion which might save it from serious blunders. The
court's rationale is that arbitration is futile for there is no doubt
possible, but the cases make obvious that what seems clear to the
court may become shot through with doubt upon inquiry by one
with expertness and understanding. If the outcome is so certain
there would be little harm in leaving it in the hands of the arbi-
trator.7 7  The only possible excuse for staying arbitration is to
protect a party from purely frivolous claims brought for purposes
of harassment. In the absence of affirmative showing of bad
faith, the court should compel arbitration. If the award is pal-
pably wrong there will still be time for correction.
74. See Carlston, Theory of the Arbitration Process, 17 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROB. 631,
637 (1952).
75. The difficulty in making such a standard articulate has been described by
Justice Frankfurter as the inescapable one arising from using "undefined defining
terms." Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U. S. 474, 489 (1951).
. 76. Out of nearly 100 reported cases in New York in which the courts have been
asked to review the substantive issues of grievances arising under arbitration clauses,
65 have come before the court at the pre-arbitration stage. In 40 of these the court
either refused to compel or stayed arbitration.
77. The analogy to administrative law might again prove helpful, for what is
involved are the principles which underly the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Compare the New York courts frequent stay
of arbitration with the Supreme Court's handling of parallel problems in 21yers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938); Petroleum Exploration Inc. v.
Public Service Commission, 304 U. S. 209 (1938); Macauley v. Waterman S. S. Corp.,
327 U. S. 540 (1946). However, the practice of the New York courts in staying ar-
bitration has its echo in New York Post v. Kelly, supra n. 72.
78. This can be some danger, for arbitration can be costly, and one of the parties
with greater resources may use arbitration as a method of financially weakening the
other. However, judicial proceedings to stay arbitration are small protection, for they
are scarcely less expensive. A more direct remedy would be to permit a civil suit in
damages for arbitration proceedings brought in bad faith with the amount of recovery
to include the costs of bringing the suit.
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The measure of review suggested has thus far been discussedin reference to interpretation of the agreement, for this is the
major problem. In some types of grievances the arbitrator isfaced with simple questions of fact. Thus in discipline cases there
may be a dispute as to whether the offense was committed, and in
strike cases there may be a dispute as to whether the union orderedit. In other cases the interpretation question may be intertwined
with a dispute as to the facts. However, the courts seldom getinvolved with these fact questions and have shown no markedinclination to review. This may be a product of judicial restraint,but it may also result from the lack of a record which can be
reviewed, and the courts are unwilling to take all of the evidence
to retry the issue.
Finally, it is necessary to state more explicitly the role whichthe courts should play in determining the "jurisdiction" of the
arbitrator or the "arbitrability" of the issue. It is generally saidthat this is a matter for the courts-that to allow an arbitrator
to determine his own jurisdiction would be to allow him to pullhimself up by his own bootstraps. 79 If the problem were one ofphrase-making we could end there, but the problem is again thepractical one of defining the function of the court in supervising
the arbitrator. First, the arbitration clause which states the juris-diction of the arbitrator depends, like any other term in the collec-tive agreement, upon. the intent of the parties. Its words are
vague, if not nearly meaningless, and the intent lies hidden deep
within the history, practices, and unwritten understanding of theparties. All of the reasons placing primary reliance upon the
arbitrator to determine intent apply with added force here. All
of the reasons for the courts exercising restraint in substitutingtheir interpretation for that of the arbitrator are equally
applicable.
Determining the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is no differentin kind than any other problem of interpretation, for to find thereis no jurisdiction is to determine the substantive rights of theparties. If the union processes a grievance and it is held there is
no jurisdiction to arbitrate that must mean either one of two
things: either the union has no just claim because management has
reserved this freedom and. the union is bound by management's
action; or both parties have reserved their freedom of action onthis point and are free to use their economic strength to obtain
their desired ends. Either management has the prerogative or the
union is free to strike-but this determines the rights of the par-
79. Supra n. 21.
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ties. The question of jurisdiction should be handled like any other
interpretation problem; the results should accord with the intent
of the parties. Thus, if the agreement provides for reopening
as to wages the question posed is whether the parties intended
that management was free to deny increases and the union was
prohibited from taking strike action, that the union was free to
strike if management denied its demands, or that economic action
was barred and that both would be bound by arbitration. To say
there is no jurisdiction is only to hold that the parties did not
intend the last alternative. 0 The problem is still one of determin-
ing the intent of the parties. This should be left to the arbitrator
subject to the limited review of. the courts.
Whether courts should be queens and with what firmness they
should rule can never be determined by the syllogistic logic of
Tweedledee. The question rather is what use can they be in this
looking-glass world of labor arbitration. If the courts are to avoid
injuring the parties by their awkwardness and to cease causing
confusion by their blunders they must recognize their own limita-
tions. They have only vague knowledge of the ways of this world,
nor do they understand clearly its language. Furthermore, they
have not been chosen by the parties-to be queen. The courts have
a function, but it is the limited one of exercising only enough
supervision to prevent labor arbitration from destroying itself.
Even in doing this the courts need to remember that the parties
themselves have placed their confidence in the arbitrator and not
in the court. The court should at best be a constitutional monarch
with vv limited powers.
"What do you mean by 'If you really
are a Queen'? What right have you
to call yourself so? You can't be a
Queen, you know, till you've passed the
proper examination. And the sooner
we begin it, the better."81
80. The courts, in holding that certain issues are not arbitrable, never indicate which
of the two remaining alternatives shall prevail. In many cases the answer is reasonably
clear, but in some the parties will be forced to return again to the courts for the final
determination of their rights.
81. Supra n. 1 at p. 167.
